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Abstract—Decentralization for data storage is a challenging problem for blockchain-based solutions as the blocksize plays the key
role for scalability. In addition, specific requirements of multimedia data calls for various changes in the blockchain technology internals.
Considering one of the most popular applications of secure multimedia streaming, i.e., video surveillance, it is not clear how to judiciously
encode incentivization, immutability and compression into a viable ecosystem. In this study, we provide a genuine scheme that achieves
this encoding for a video surveillance application. The proposed scheme provides a novel integration of data compression, immutable
off-chain data storage using a new consensus protocol namely, proof of work storage (PoWS) in order to enable fully useful work to be
performed by the miner nodes of the network. The proposed idea is the first step towards achieving greener application of blockchain-
based environment to the video storage business that utilizes system resources efficiently.
Index Terms—DLT, Blockchain, data compression, PoW, PoS, multimedia, decentralization.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
A CCORDING to recent estimations, there will be over 20billion connected devices by 2020, all of which will
generate and then require management, storage, and re-
trieval of large size of data [1]. Connected devices, combined
with consumer-based applications and the increasing need
to share data across different business lines, are all playing
their part in increasing demand for processing and data
storage. Some of these data inherently requires immutabil-
ity and calls for long term retention. For instance, think
about government archiving or another popular example of
video/data surveillance. Businesses desiring to launch new,
data-driven applications are bound to confront with incredi-
ble amount of time, effort and coordination to provision new
databases today. Now we begin to see dominant commercial
and revenue dependency on data which leads to large
volumes being stored in vulnerable centralized databases
(even in the cloud), creating privacy and durability risks at
a scale seldom seen before in history.
Today, the dominant practice in unstructured data stor-
age is based on a local or remote single system architecture
or cloud-based file/block/object storages (such as Amozon
S3 [2] etc.) which are still highly centralized. Although they
can be distributed, they are still in governance of a single
body of management and hence these systems are definitely
considered as a beacon for hackers (both external and inter-
nal) looking to attack. They also have many points of failure
should the managing company’s ecosystem is affected by an
unpredictable system error or experiences down time as a
result of a power outage. In addition, data type being stored
has an immense effect on the management decisions. For
example, multimedia sources are time dependent series of
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data and must carefully be protected and communicated
by paying attention to streaming requirements. In contrast,
decentralized storage doesnt encounter these problems be-
cause it utilizes geographically distributed anonymous or
permitted individual nodes, either regionally or globally.
Hence, meeting point of any applications based on decen-
tralized video involves several challenges to tackle. One of
the proven distributed paradigm for storage is known as
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) [3].
DLT can be implemented using different consensus algo-
rithms to ascertain that the world view of each node is the
same. Old traditional way is centered around voting-based
consensus such as Paxos [4] then the more understandable
version that goes with the name Raft [5]. Most recently,
random consensus algorithms have gained popularity. One
of the consensus approaches to DLT that became quite com-
mon in decentralized cryptocurrency market is blockchain
[6]. Considering some open-source public blockchains (such
as bitcoin [7] and Ethereum [8]), the set of transactions that
are stored within the linked-list of blocks generates a type of
decentralized database or storage of structured data. How-
ever due to scalability concerns, the size of blocks cannot
grow very large and hence it is not hard to see that these
public blockchains are not designed for bulk data storage
and management, and using them to do so would consume
too much local space, too much time for processing and too
much energy to fulfill all the executions. Let us explore some
of the decentralized data storage options previously devised
and implemented.
1.1 Storing data on the blockchain:
Blockchains are immutable constructs and hence do not
allow random access for write and frequent changes. Also,
only limited number of blocks can be securely added to the
chain for a given time period, which makes the throughput
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2Project Smart Contracts Multi-regionredundancy Feature Consensus Scalability (1-3)
Sia Yes Yes Archieving,Very decentralized own BC BFT 2
Storj No Yes Object,ECC encrypted,sharded, DHT, ETH Proof of Retrievablity 1
ETH Swarm Yes Yes DHT, ETH Proof of Retrievablity 1
FileCoin Yes Yes IPFS, Replication Proof of Replication 1-2
MaidSafe No Yes No Blockchain Close group consensus 3
TABLE 1
Some decentralized cloud data storage projects centered around distributed technologies. Provided is a rough and relative estimation of scalability
using a range of 1-3. Larger the number is, better scalability it possesses. BC: Blockchain. BFT: Byzantine Fault Tolerance
fail to meet most of the data storage requirements. In ad-
dition, since the size of the data might be arbitrarily large
and full nodes are supposed to store the entire blockchain,
the capacity required storing it will eventually exceed the
persistent storage space of many full nodes of the network
[9]. Thus, only a specific set of nodes in the network would
be able to hold the entire blockchain. This in turn will lead
to centralization problem i.e., only few nodes will dominate
the database system which in turn will cause loss of security
because only couple of known and capable nodes will be
able to actively participating in the mining process.
1.2 Peer-2-peer file systems:
This approach is based on sharing files on client computers
and uniting them using a global file system interface. This
technology utilizes a similar protocol to BitTorrent [10] and
Distributed Hash Table (DHT) concepts. Unlike IPs and
ports, the data contents will be content addressable using
hashes of the content allowing separation of storage location
and data. Data is available only if the nodes storing the
copies are online. Once the data content is replicated enough
number of times, the availability/reliability of data is no
longer a concern. DHT-based technology serves only static
files which can not be modified or removed once uploaded.
The deletion of files cannot be ensured as this technology is
not intended to do so. In other words, the number of copies
are not determined by the system but rather the request
pattern on that data by the network nodes. Lastly, the stored
files cannot be searched by their meaningful content. One of
the well known succesful implementations of this idea is
known as InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) [11].
1.3 Decentralized Cloud File Storages:
Most of these systems resemble to centralized cloud file
storages such as Dropbox [12]. Peers in the network offer
their unused persistent storage space for rent and gets
rewards in return for providing data storage space and
services. Some of the examples include Sia [13], Storj [14],
Swarm [15], Filecoin [16] and MaidSafe [17] which are listed
and summarized in Table 1 based on the technologies they
are made of. These storage systems provide highly reliable,
enormous capacity with varying degrees of access latency
and security. As can be seen most of them are based on
an implementation of blockchain technology and backed by
some kind of incentivization, so these projects serve static
files only, no content search is allowed (unless a specific
feature gets added as they are all evolving projects) and,
since they are built on peers or anonymous rented hardware,
they are not free of charge. All these projects are optimized
for file storage (show decent performance with file accesses)
but fairly fall short in accommodating for time-series data
(such as Multimedia or IoT data etc.) An example of such
data include append-only data streams, with a single writer
and lots of readers. Although recently few attempts are
made towards creating data storage and sharing ecosystems
for IoT systems, none adequately addresses the streaming
data requirements [18].
1.4 Blockchain-based solutions for copyright Protec-
tion and Video Hashing:
Blockchain technology is very attractive solution for online
electronic notary services, document certification, proof of
ownership and authenticity. Most of such initiatives tar-
geted mobile devices and application development environ-
ments whereas the blockchain formed the back-end registrar
for document hashes and related information etc. In some
of these applications, decentralized database systems are
preferred (such as BigChainDB [19] or TiesDB) and the
rest use content-addressable decentralized options (such as
IPFS). Examples include initiatives such as Block Notary,
Stampery [20], Verif-y [21]. On the other hand, there are
also available video sharing and video streaming services
based on blockchains [22]. These services verify ownership
of each video content as a whole. LIVEPEER for instance
is structured for broadcasting by transcoding video source
into all formats and bitrates. Flixxo and Viuly are video
sharing platforms [23], in a way competitor projects to
Youtube Inc., by offering an entirely decentralized plat-
form in which, contrary to their competitor cloud-based
providers, not only content generators are rewarded but
also are the content viewers as well. Viuly is based on
Ethereum smart contracts and hence do not possess their
own blockchain implementation. There are also relatively
new projects which combine different technologies to offer
video content delivery, sharing, incentivization, security at
the same time (e.g., CoinTube [24]). As a matter of fact,
many of these initiatives can be classified as one of the
following combinations as shown in Figure 1. By choosing
an open source project for each layer, one can put together
a decentralized application (Dapp) and announce an ICO
easily if any sort of incentivization is desired.
Despite all these new technologies centered around open
source platforms, todays technologies requirements vary at
a great scale as we move from one application to another.
For instance, we can note that none of these studies
a. Guarantee the originality of uploaded files, integrity
and authenticity of the video content.
b. No verification process for recorded/uploaded
videos is explicitly defined.
3Fig. 1. : Layers of Functionality for a decentralized/Incentivized Com-
puter System. PoW: Proof of Work, PoS:Proof of Stake. Coin represents
some form of currency used to incentivize the system.
c. No supporting proof of time, location, other sensor
data to help the verification process of the video
authenticity.
d. No genuine immutability (that comprises the full
content of data) concept other than the linked list
of hashing offered by classical blockchains.
e. No genuine consensus best fitted for video process-
ing/surveillance data and applications.
To address some of these issues, PROVER project
(though ICO) and few later publications ( [25]) has recently
be crowdsold and attracted attention since this service ad-
dressed a, b and c to some degree. According to PROVER,
mobile device users use Swype ID by moving their cell
phone in a specific direction (generated pseudorandomly
by the application) to generate code and hashes of the
content to be stored in the blockchain. PROVER do not care
about where the original content of the data is stored or
for some reason whether it is erased. It is particularly de-
signed for checking authenticity and integrity which alone
opens up a wide range of applications including video
surveillance. However, PROVER is powered by Ethereum or
NEM blockchains [26] which have their own consensus al-
gorithms predetermined and run by their own development
environments (PoW for Ethereum at the time of writing this
paper and PoI: Proof of Importance for NEM). In addition
PROVER does treat the video files as a whole and do not
use its differentiating features that can be combined with
blockchain to provide more efficient and useful recording
experience which will contribute to scalability and flexibility
of the overall system. In this disclosure, we will be pre-
senting general architectural components when combined
together will best fit in video streaming and surveillance
applications.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2.,
we introduce the compress-store architecture and provide
the details of the proposed system. In Section 3, we dive
into the details of the implementation and system-level deci-
sions. We also provide advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed scheme compared to the state-of-the-art. Finally,
section 4 concludes the paper with few future directions.
2 COMPRESS-STORE ARCHITECTURE
We propose to use blockchain for metadata (description
of which will follow later) storage while the bulk of data
is stored off-chain using a distributed hash table system.
The off-chain choice is completely arbitrary and could be
replaced with existing cloud services such as Azure [27]
or S3 [2]. However, we provide desirable properties of a
blockchain applied to bulk data as well such as chain-
ing blocks before moving it to off-chain storage. Here are
some properties of the proposed compress-store system;
(a) Mining/Consensus is based on the novel Proof-of-
WorkStore(PoWS) concept which we will detail later, (b)
processing/Compression will be decentralized and some
compression related parameters will be stored in blockchain
for later verification of recording time, recording place, var-
ious sensor information and (c) data is selectively chained
and encrypted. We will detail these properties of the system
next.
2.1 Consensus: Proof of WorkStore (PoWS)
Bitcoins network uses Proof of Work (PoW) consensus
algorithm in which the blocks are mined by solving a
mathematical challenge [28], [7]. This challenge enables the
network nodes to reach a consensus and the network in
return rewards those nodes who participated in system
maintenance and security by offering their CPU resources
and solving the challenge. However, there are a couple of
problems with the original concept of PoW:
• It leads to exceedingly much and useless en-
ergy/power consumption. Zero efficiency results
due to finding a solution to a mathematical puzzle
that means no useful work is done. PoW is used to
sustain the security of the network run in a public
domain.
• The time it takes to show PoW depends on a time-
dependent difficulty level. This level increases over
time as more miners participate in the ever-growing
network. Increased difficulty level will lead to block
mining process to slow down. Also in order to limit
the chain forking to a minimum, average time be-
tween two mining instants is adjusted to meet some
criterion. Such adjustments leads to low transaction
throughput performance as the size of the block (and
hence the number of transactions that it contains) is
usually not larger than 1MB (in the Bitcoin case - sim-
ilar sizes apply for other popular public blockchains).
• In deflationary crypto ecosystems, when mining re-
wards cease, only transcation fees will incentivize
the system. Once these fees drop, the number of
miners will decline for service leading to unsecure
and unprotected system.
The other alternative applicable methods include proof
of stake(PoS), proof of Space (PoSpace), proof of Stoage(PoS)
and proof of Importance (PoI) etc [29]. and none of which
require elevated CPU and ASIC requirements for better
throughput performance and green decentralization. In
Proof of Storage (PoS), miners have to show a proof for
enough storage space to store the corresponding data and
will have to guarantee that it never erases data in their
local or remotely owned storage slots. There are few ways
of implementing PoS in literature depending on what is
exactly being achieved. Some of PoS schemes include Proof
of Retrievability, Provable Data possession, Proof of Replica-
tion and the most common implementations to all is to use
cryptographic operations and periodic auditing protocols
[30].
4Since the ideal decentralized computer system is ex-
pected to establish both decentralized computing and stor-
age at the same time, it is essential that we provide in our
video surveillance system (1) Video Processing (compres-
sion in our particular case) (2) Data storage (3) Immutability
and (4) Security. Video compression has two advantages:
first it requires some form of computation due to video
processing (transformation, quantization and coding) and
this can be done in a decentralized fashion and yet does
not pose a lot of useless computations as in original PoW
and the difficulty only changes as new compression al-
gorithms and techniques or new quality requirements are
integrated/imposed into/onto the network. This will form
the proof of work part of our consensus, namely PoWS.
The second advantage is that since raw video files would
be compressed at a specified quality, we can save a lot of
storage space. This does not only mean that we will be
saving storage resources but also computation resources
that might be due to encryption, digital signature generation
etc. Note that one other advantage comes at no cost from
the incentivization point of view, because miners may want
to choose high compression performance to be able to find
storage place quickly and hence be successful at mining
process. This will lead to total storage of the system to be
used wisely.
Video files are bulky and it is always hard to deal with
large volumes of data. In the compress-store architecture,
the data storage is provided off-chain using a distributed
hash table system. One possible realization is the content-
addressed data chunk storage technologies such as IPFS. In
that case the data location is represented by a unique hash
and we separate the content location in the network and the
IP/port number of the server. However, all location pointers
will be stored in the blockchain. Finally since the metadata
is stored in the blockchain, it is immutable and cannot be
changed by any easy means.
The main idea behind inserting some kind of PoW into
our system is first to dramatically increase the scalability
of the system and it would make really hard to generate
compressed sequences of thousands of frames in a relatively
short time (unless application specific hardware is used.
However, keep in mind that video encoders comes in great
variety of parameter selections and algorithmic differences)
which discourages attackers and allows the network to use
the proposed system in the public domain.
2.2 Throughput of the Surveillance System
In one application of the proposed idea, miners compress
video frames. Video files are typically partitioned into
Group of Pictures (GOP) and each is processed indepdent of
the other. Hence we define throughput to be the processed
frames committed to the blockchain per second. In a typical
scenario, a GOP can contain 25 pictures and each block can
describe around 5 GOPs at the same time. If each block is
verified and added to blockchain every 10 secs, this makes
12.5 frames or pictures per second (pps). This is extremely
slow rate compared to the level of video generation by
the system in a typical surveillance application. Obvious
way to improve throughput is to increase GOP size at the
expense of lesser quality compression and larger storage
requirement. Another popular way to alleviate this is the
method of sharding [31] that is also being considered to
solve the scalability issues of popular public blockchains
such as Ethereum. In that scheme, miners choose a GOP or
a consecutive group of GOPs pseudorandomly and work on
their compression workload. This would allow parallelism
in the network and hence would ensure better throughput
performance. However implementation of such a scheme
might be a bit tricky.
Yet, another approach is to make the blockchain private.
In that case, the security requirements will be less of an issue
due to trusted parties and hence more frequent block addi-
tions to the chain can be realized. This would eventually
lead to better throughput.
2.3 Private/Public Blockchain applications
In one private blockchain implementation of the proposed
idea, compression workload can completely be handled by
the video generator node that we call initiator node. This
process can alternatively be handled completely decentral-
ized if need be. In that case, the PoW part of our system
can be avoided since the participators are assumed to be
trusted parties and pose no risk to the system. This way,
the number of committed video frames into the blockchain
can be increased dramatically and consensus can be reached
a lot easily. This will eventually increase the throughput of
the system. Although a form of centralization may dominate
(also due to a subset of miner node selection process), all
other properties of the proposed scheme will still serve
a number of advantages regarding the video surveillance
applications.
In one public blockchain implementation of the pro-
posed idea, we shall use PoWS at full scale. Compared to
private counterpart, there are number of differences in this
case. First, we decentralize the computation by allowing
miner nodes to compress and encrypt video frames, find an
appropriate storage location before preparing and adding
the related metadata into the blockchain. Since these are
third party participators, we propose to incentivize them
by coins which will help them process more videos and
use storage space. We also incentivize better compression
(avoid dump compression styles) because finding an ap-
propriate storage location and space can only be found
through paying the required amount using coins. Miner
nodes are motivated to use better methods to be able to ask
for less storage space that also meets a predefined (just like
difficulty level of a Bitcoin network) quality requirement.
This quality requirement may be updated as the network
evolves or more miners participate. We refer the reader to
the mining process for details.
3 IMPLEMENTATION AND SYSTEM DETAILS
In this section, we provide the implementation and system-
level details. some of these details are related to verification
and data storage phases. Later, we shall compare these
details with the state-of-the-art.
53.1 The procedure for Verification and Storage
In our compress-store architecture, we define three types
of nodes which have their own way of behavior explained
below.
1. Initiator nodes: These nodes are usually equipped
with video camcorders and are able to modify/edit
recorded video streams. These streams can be di-
vided into one or more groups of GOPs. The cap-
tured GOPs are usually selected to be small and they
constitute the block of information to be processed
by the network.
2. Mining nodes: These nodes are equipped with video
compression tools/encoding software or hardware.
They process arrived frames of a GOP and send
indentification information to the network to ini-
tiate verification process. Once their work is veri-
fied, a block representing one GOP is added to the
blockchain and they are rewarded with more storage
space to use for mining.
3. Storage nodes: These nodes are responsible of stor-
ing bulk data which is in our case the compressed
multimedia source files. These files are stored en-
crypted after compression. Storage nodes run a form
of PoS algorithm to make sure that they reserved
the amount of space that they promise to. Although
block verification verify the availability of data and
the storage space, a travelling auditing service shall
be used by the network to check this verification
process at a regular basis. Storage nodes receive fees
once they complete all the requirements of the PoS
and as long as they store the multimedia data.
Physical nodes of our peer-2-peer network can assume
all these three types of node capabilities. For instance, full
nodes can initiate video storage, mine frames and store
compressed multimedia data at the same time. On the other
hand, verifier nodes are all participating network nodes that
store a copy of the blockchain.
The multimedia data itself is NOT stored in the
blockchain. Instead their representative data is maintained
on-chain serving as pointers to their stored locations. We de-
fine a subblock to include the following information: 1. The
time GOP is generated, 2. Hash of the GOP (through Merkle
root), 3. Access privileges, 4. The location of stored GOP
(this does not need to be a physical address, an alternative
is to use content addressing, also geographical location can
be incorporated), 5. Metadata about the stored multimedia
content such as compression algorithm, parameters, etc. In
addition, Variety of sensor information, GOP index and
order, video identification number/labeling could also be
part of the subblock for further verification process. These
additional information is important for the reconstruction
of the video files. Once a subblock is formed it is digitally
signed with initiators private key before sending in to net-
work. Miner nodes shall collect enough number of such sub-
blocks and the associated multimedia data frames/GOPs
to start compression process immediately after such sub-
blocks make up a predetermined block size (determined
by the overall network). This predetermined block size is
analogous to the block size of other crypto-networks such
as Bitcoin.
Fig. 2. An example of two GOPs and the procedure of Merkle root
computation within and across GOPs.
For compression to make sense, an initiator must set a
quality measure such as Mean square Error (MSE) or a peak
signal to noise ratio (PSNR) or an another subjective multi-
media quality indicator that will help identify that two files
are the same except one of them is the compressed version.
There are few technologies/algorithms that identifies two
video files to be the same whether they are compressed
or not. Miners time to mine a block requires the miner to
complete the compression process (by going through each
sub-compression steps), meet the quality measure require-
ment, compute the merkle hash tree of a GOP, chain the
video frames, encrypt the content, find a storage node (or his
own local resources) which ensures storage space required
to store the compressed content (generate a proof). In order
to make the size of a block even smaller, we employ Merkle
hash tree of GOPs as well. The way the Merkle root is
computed is shown in Figure 2.
Once this work is done, the mining node broadcasts
the block/s to the network that has all the information
about the GOP except the bulk data itself. All verifier nodes
which receive this block begin the verification process which
would involve:
a. A comprehensive check whether GOPs are really
stored in the designated locations. This requires
preparing intelligent challenges for provers (miners)
for PoS.
b. A comprehensive check for the merkle hash by re-
questing hashes of the frames and GOPs from stor-
age node/s.
c. A comprehensive check for the quality measure
whether it meets or not, using the uncompressed
GOP data. This is to ensure that the miner nodes
are legitimately compressed the multimedia file. This
effort in fact characterizes a form of Proof of Com-
pression (PoC).
Once verified, all uncompressed copies are removed
from verifier node caches to open storage space for the
next uncompressed GOP/s data. As can be observed, since
blocks do not include transactions in our case, we keep
the size of the block that contains metadata for GOP/s to
around only a fraction of KBs. This is to limit the total
size of the blockchain stored in all of the verifier nodes.
One can realize that as we include more metadata (sensor
6Fig. 3. Data chaining combined with video compression and predictive frame coding. .
information etc.) in the blockchain, we can increase the secu-
rity, authenticity and reliability of the system at the expense
of reduced scalability and throughput, which is infact the
fundamental trade-off any blockchain system faces today.
Depending on the compression scheme, video frames
can be predicted from each other. In a typical compression
scenario, we can classify frames as I and P frames where
I is intra-coded frame i.e., the image gets compressed by
itself whereas P frames are predicted from the associated I
frame and one previous P frame. In another compression
scenario, we can have B frames that shall be predicted from
two or more P frames. A GOP will contain one I frame
in the beginning and all the rest would be P (and/or B)
frames. In order to chain the data for immutability, I frames
of a video source file are selected to contain a hash value of
the previous I frame and the latest P frame in the previous
GOP. Due to predictive nature of compression algorithm, P
frames are automatically chained to I frames and hence are
not separately chained using cryptographic functions. This
will reduce the computation requirements due to hashing
process as the increased size of bulk data leads to more
computation to complete the hashing operation. A detailed
illustration of how the prediction and the hashing are done
all together in the compress-store architecture is briefly
shown in Figure 3.
Next we provide the summary of steps for a full node to
initiate, mine, store and verify a recorded video.
1) A video file is streamed to the miner network nodes
GOP by GOP (GOPs can be thought as transactions
in crypto context and these are referred as GOP
transactions in our context) where each GOP trans-
actions (txns) is digitally signed by the issuer for
authentication. This step is used to prevent potential
outsourcing and authenticate the work (both for
PoW and PoS). The specific format of GOP trans-
actions are implementation-specific.
2) Miner nodes collect/pack a set of GOP txns, au-
thenticate them, process them and then compose
a (associated) set of subblocks to make up a block
(block size determines the number of subblocks that
can be bundled together) that also contains the hash
of the previous block.
3) In one application of proposed idea, miners PoW
may include compression and encryption of the
set of collected/packed GOP data (txns). This is
referred as processing in step 3.
4) On the other hand, miners PoS include a proof for
the storage of the compressed and encrypted con-
tent included with the prepared block. The storage
can be provided with cloud services or any other
peer of the network with local persistent storage.
However, with digital signature requirement, out-
sourcing may be forbidden by the internal system
management.
5) Miners place the location of the compressed data,
associated hash values such as merkle tree root or
leaf node hashes, compression algorithm name and
parameters, quality measure, any additional data
(such as proofs) that would be useful for verification
into the (subblocks) blocks and broadcast it for
verification.
6) Verifier nodes read the contents of the block and eas-
ily verify that the content is accurately compressed,
properly encrypted, and stored according to a pre-
defined quality measure (using various proofs in-
cluded with blocks).
7) Once the verification process successfully ends, the
block is added to the local blockchain. If any of the
requirements is not satisfied, the block is not added
to the blockchain and the verifier node moves on to
the next verification process waiting in the network.
Some potential problems and workarounds: One of
the risks is the following. Particularly in public domain,
broadcasting the whole raw video GOP by GOP might be
too bandwidth consuming and will lead to data traffic most
of which is useless (except for the node that successfully
fulfill all the requirements of mining). As a solution, initiator
nodes may store their raw videos either locally or remotely
and broadcasts the location and hash value of data for
miners to download and check. This will make download
speed and bandwidth be part of the equation in PoWS. In
case of sharding, miners may only download GOPs that are
not mined yet which will lead to efficient use of network
resources.
3.2 Advantages and Differentiation compared to the
state-of-the-art
First of all, the proposed scheme ensures data immutability
through the blockchain as well as data chaining that con-
7nects I frames (self-compressed frames) of the compressed
video as described. The predictive nature of the compression
process is used to add an extra layer of chaining between
different kinds of compressed video frames. Thus, any
tempering on data can immediately be detected since this
attempt will change all hash results in a propagated fashion.
Plus, changing a block content will require all following
blocks to change which will require PoWS for all GOPs cov-
ered by these blocks. This would require a large volume of
computation as well as secured storage space. Secondly, the
concept of PoWS does not allow our system to have a solely
CPU-based mining which can lead to hardware specific
implementations and hence centralization. Additionally un-
like bitcoins proof of work mechanism, PoW component of
PoWS does require miners to perform useful work, i.e., in
an application of the proposed idea, a miner can compress
a video file using his CPU and network resources. This
way, miner will make his job easier when finding nodes to
store the compressed content. More compression will help
miners spend less for data storage and bandwidth at the
expense of more CPU power. On the other end, Miners can
choose to go with a simpler compression technique at the ex-
pense of larger storage space committed for the compressed
content. Such variations of the proposed idea lead miners
to complete the total work of PoWS at different instants
of time and hence block generation happens at relatively
different times. As a result of that, potential (soft) forks
(in the blockchain convergence process) will be eliminated
without them getting too large (lengthy) i.e., convergence of
consensus will be faster.
4 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this study, a genuine video surveillance system based on
digital ledger technology is presented. the proposed scheme
uses data compression and storage as means of proofs in
order to provide green consensus which would help net-
work participants to commit their resources for useful work.
Finally, the details of the proposed scheme is presented
by providing comparisons to state-of-the-art schemes. As
future work, we would like to extend the implementation
details of the system to include image files. The application
areas can be extended to include image restoration, mul-
timedia regeneration and data mining. Finally, large-scale
simulations are envisioned to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed idea in real test beds.
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